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THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERIM





"Interim decisions may be of greater consequence to discretionary
justice than final decisions."' This observation by Kenneth Culp Davis
constitutes the chief theme of this Article: the extent to which interme-
diate processes and decisions affect the criminal trial court's final dispo-
sition. The study presented here treats criminal court disposition not as
a single decision but rather as the result of a number of separate admin-
istrative processes. The administrative processes on which the study fo-
cuses-jailing defendants before trial, providing defense service to
indigent defendants, and plea bargaining---exhibit much variation,
probably because they are largely exempt from any sort of review. The
study compares the effect of these interim processes on the final disposi-
tion to the contribution of such "basic factors" as the defendant's char-
acteristics and the strength of the legal case against him or her.
Section II of the Article outlines the data and methods used in the
study. Section III provides a brief description of the defendants and the
dispositions they received, as well as some material on plea bargaining
* The research on which this article is based was partially supported by a grant from the
National Institute of Justice to the North Carolina Governor's Crime Commission. Neither
agency is responsible for the contents of the article.
** Associate Professor of Public Law and Government, Institute of Government, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. LL.B., Columbia University, 1966; A.B., Harvard
University, 1958.
*** Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA; formerly Research Coordinator, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Ph.D., University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill, 1983; M.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1978; B.A.,
University of California at San Diego, 1976.
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laws and practices in the jurisdiction studied. Section IV presents re-
gression models developed to measure the association of basic factors
and administrative processes with court dispositions. Our findings are
summarized in Section V. Section VI suggests some reforms that are
consistent with the study results.
II. DATA AND METHODS
The data on which most of this Article is based were drawn from
court and police records concerning the prosecution and court disposi-
tion of 1,378 defendants charged with felonies in twelve North Carolina
counties during three months in 1979.2 These twelve were chosen as a
reasonable cross-section of the state's 100 counties. 3 The three urban
counties-Mecklenburg, Buncombe, and New Hanover--dominate the
data because they have many more felony defendants than the rural
counties, but urban counties have a higher incidence of felony defend-
ants throughout the state.
4
Our aim was to identify factors that influenced, or at least were
correlated with, the decisions made in the criminal process. Therefore,
in collecting the data, we sought to reconstruct the information known
to the various decision-makers--especially the police and the district at-
torney-at the time of prosecution. We searched local police and court
records that were then accessible to the police and prosecutor. These
records included: (1) the complaint file (the police or sheriff's record of
the crime report); (2) the police or sheriff's record of the crime investiga-
tion, which was sometimes part of the -complaint file, sometimes a sepa-
rate record, and sometimes part of the arrest record; (3) the police or
sheriffs record of the arrest; (4) the trial court record folder or envelope
plus all of the papers it contained; (5) the trial court name index files,
2 Most defendants' cases reached disposition in 1979, although a few remained pending
until 1980. For Mecklenburg County, defendants whose charges were filed in January
through March 1979 were studied; in the other eleven counties, we studied defendants whose
charges were filed in April through June 1979.
3 One urban county was selected from each region of the state-western, central, and
eastern. The non-urban counties were grouped into twelve categories corresponding to the
twelve cross-classifieations of region, size of the court workload, and an assessment of overall
court efficiency. One non-urban county was selected at random from each of these twelve
categories. Later, to reduce travel costs, a non-urban county was eliminated at random from
each region, leaving nine non-urban counties. The twelve counties varied greatly in geo-
graphical size and population. The 1980 populations ranged from 14,934 (Yancey) to
404,270 (Mecklenburg). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS
OF POPULATION, Vol. 1, Part 35, Table 45, at 162 (1982).
4 The breakdown of the 1,378 defendants in the sample by county was: Mecklenburg
(including Charlotte)-35.8%; New Hanover (including Wilmington)-14.7%; Buncombe
(including Asheville)-13.6%; Rockingham (including Reidsville)-10. 1%; Craven (including




searched to ensure that all of the defendant's companion cases were cap-
tured; and (6) the district attorney's files.
Our data do not completely describe what the police and the prose-
cutor actually knew at the time of prosecution for at least two reasons:
they sometimes had important information not kept in any available
record, and they may not have looked at all of the records that we ex-
amined. We believe, however, that information written in the records
had an important influence on the outcome of prosecution, and our sta-
tistical analysis supports this' belief.5
The unit of data in our analysis was the individual defendant.
When a defendant had more than one felony charge-and 30% of the
1,378 defendants did (see Table 1)-all concurrently processed felony
charges were traced through the records of both the district and superior
court.6 In collecting the data, the "principal" charge was emphasized,
but some information was also collected on companion charges. The
principal charge was the charge on which the defendant received the
longest active (unsuspended) prison sentence; if acquitted, the principal
charge was that with the longest statutory maximum sentence.
The data included:
* Characteristics of the defendant-age, race, sex, employment, resi-
dence, and criminal record.
* Important aspects of the case against the defendant-the number of
felony charges, the principal charge, the number of codefendants, and
information on evidence and extent of injury or damage caused by the
crime.
* Information about the victim, including his or her relationship to the
defendant.
* Details of the processing of the defendant's charges, with emphasis on
the principal charge.
5 We regard these data as reasonably representative of felony prosecution and sentencing
in North Carolina in 1979, even though they were not drawn from a random sample. The
multivariate statistical methods we used, in which the simultaneous effects of a number of
variables were taken into account, made it less likely that a finding regarding any single
variable could be due to sampling bias.
6 Data on accompanying misdemeanor charges were usually not collected, but such




TWELVE-COUNTY SAMPLE: DISTRIBUTION OF




























Four or more 8.6 (119)
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Type of Principal Felony Charge of Total of this Class (N)
Class 1 - Violent Felonies 23.6 (325)
Murder and manslaughter 8.6 (28)
Assault without intent to kill 31.7 (103)
Assault with intent to kill 19.7 (64)
Rape 9.5 (31)
Burning (includes arson) 5.2 (17)
Common law robbery 7.4 (24)
Armed robbery 14.2 (46)
Kidnapping 3.7 (12)
Class 2 - Felonious Larceny, 45.9 (633)
Breaking or Entering, etc.
Burglary 3.8 (24)
Breaking or entering 13.3 (84)
Breaking or entering and 45.8 (290)
larceny combined
Larceny 27.5 (174)
Possession or receipt of stolen 9.6 (61)
goods
Class 3 - Fraud, Forgery, 11.9 (164)
Embezzlement, etc.
Fraud (includes larceny by 59.8 (98)
employee, embezzlement, false
pretense, theft of credit card,
etc.)
Forgery and uttering (passing) 40.2 (66)
forged instrument
Class 4 - Drug Felonies 13.4 (185)
Manufacture, sale, or possession 61.6 (114)
for purpose of sale of
controlled substance






Type of Principal Felony Charge of Total of this Class (N)
Class 5 - Morals Felonies
(primarily crime against nature 1.9 (26)
and indecent liberties with
child)
Class 6 - Other Felonies 3.3 (45)
Felonious escape 57.8 (26)
Other (including felonious 42.2 (19)
leaving scene of accident)
TOTAL - All Classes 100.0 (1,378)
The study used such techniques of statistical analysis as tabulations
of means and proportions. Regression modelling was used to test the
effect of each variable while controlling for others. This technique has
the same limitation in the present study as it has in any study that is-
and must be-an analysis of a "slice of history" rather than a controlled
experiment; it is impossible to be certain that all extraneous factors of
importance have been identified and properly measured. As a result, an
apparently significant relationship between an independent variable
and the dependent variable may in reality be attributable to some other
unknown or improperly measured factor.
7
III. DEFENDANTS AND DISPOSITIONS
A. DEFENDANTS AND THEIR CHARGES
The felony defendants in the twelve-county sample were mostly
young males (see Table 1); only 12.2% were female. The median age
was twenty-three, and half of the defendants were between nineteen and
thirty years of age. Forty-seven and five-tenths percent of the defend-
ants were black-more than twice the proportion of blacks in the gen-
eral population.8 Most defendants resided in the county where they
were prosecuted; only 3.8% were out-of-state residents.
Defendants were divided into six classes based on the type of felony
with which they were initially charged (see Table 1). The classes were
7 In the regression analysis, we did not test for interaction effects. In fitting the models,
we sought to obtain an estimated average effect of our variables, one that would lend itself to
straightforward interpretation. We expected that if there were interaction effects, they would
not be dramatic, and that at least the direction of each variable's effects would be the same
over levels of other variables.
8 In the twelve-county sample, the proportion of blacks was 47.5%; among male defend-
ants aged 15 to 29, 48.2% were black. This last proportion was much greater than the propor-
tion of blacks among males age 15 to 29 in the twelve counties in 1980-25.4%. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, supra note 3, at 162-86.
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Class 1-violent felonies (23.6% of the defendants); Class 2-felonious
breaking or entering, larceny, possession and receiving of stolen goods,
and related offenses (45.9%); Class 3-fraud felonies like forgery, ob-
taining property by false pretense, and credit card fraud (11.9%); Class
4-drug felonies (13.4%); Class 5-"morals" felonies (1.9%); and Class
6--other felonies (3.3%).
B. COUNSEL, PRETRIAL RELEASE, AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
Most defendants (86.2%) were known to have been represented by
counsel; only 6.7% were known to have been unrepresented, and 7.1%
had an unknown counsel status (see Table 2). Thirty-four percent paid
for their own attorney; the courts found 27.9% indigent and appointed
individual attorneys to represent them. Another 24.3% were found indi-
TABLE 2
TWELVE-COUNTY SAMPLE: ATTORNEY, PRETRIAL RELEASE, AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION
Percentage (N)
1. Type of attorney:
Total 100.0 (1,378)
No attorney 6.7 (93)
Public defender 24.3 (335)
Individually appointed 27.9 (384)
Private counsel 34.0 (468)
Unknown 7.1 (98)
2. Type of pretrial release:
Total 100.0 (1,378)
Written promise to appear 4.5 (62)
Unsecured appearance bond 11.7 (161)
Third-party custody 12.0 (166)
Secured bond: cash deposit 2.5 (35)
Secured bond: real or personal property 1.7 (24)
Secured bond: accommodation bondsman 14.4 (199)
Secured bond: professional bondsman 27.0 (372)
Released but type unknown 1.6 (22)
Not released 22.5 (310)
Not arrested 0.9 (12)
Unknown 1.1 (15)
25th 75th
N Mean Median Percentile Percentile




gent and were represented by a public defender. Public defender offices
existed in only two of the twelve counties studied-Buncombe and
Mecklenburg-but these two counties contributed half of the defend-
ants in the sample.
All but twelve of the 1,378 defendants' prosecutions began with an
arrest. About one-fifth (22.5%) of the arrested defendants were not re-
leased before trial (see Table 2). The remaining arrested defendants re-
ceived some form of pretrial release. 9 Considering all of the arrested
defendants together, the median time they spent in detention before
their first release was one day, and the mean was 15.8 days. Twenty-five
percent of the defendants spent thirteen or more days in pretrial
detention. 10
C. COURT DISPOSITIONS
Figure 1 depicts the various court dispositions for the 1,350 felony
defendants whose cases began by arrest or summons, together with the
median time from arrest or summons that elapsed in reaching each type
of disposition. It excludes the twenty-eight defendants who were in-
dicted directly and never passed through district court. The district
court disposed of nearly half of these defendants without indictments.'I
This rate of pre-indictment felony disposition may seem high. Recent
research' 2 indicates, however, that disposition of felonies before indict-
ment is common in other jurisdictions.
Twenty-six and two-tenths percent of all the defendants had all
their charges dismissed in district court. The prosecutor entered most of
the district court dismissals, accounting for 20.2% of the defendants' dis-
positions; the district court dismissed only 5.9% of the defendants for
lack of probable cause. Pleas of guilty to lesser-included misdemeanor
charges were also common in district court; 20.6% of the felony
9 Of the arrested defendants, 27.0% were released on an appearance bond secured by a
professional bondsman, 14.4% on a bond secured by a nonprofessional surety such as a friend
or relative, 2.5% on a bond secured by a cash deposit, and 1.7% on a bond secured by a
mortgage of real or personal property. Another 11.7% of the arrested defendants obtained
release on unsecured bond, 12.0% were released in the custody of a third party who agreed to
supervise them, and 4.5% were released on a written promise to appear.
10 The main North Carolina statutes on pretrial release are N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-521
to -544 (1978).
11 If the defendant "appealed" his district court conviction and thereby received a trial de
novo in superior court, or if he were indicted later after a district court dismissal for lack of
probable cause, we collected data on the superior court disposition. Thus, these 47.9% went no
further than district court-otherwise they would have been counted among the superior court
dispositions.





COURT PROCESSING DIAGRAM: TWELVE COUNTIES
Felony defendants whose cases
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prosecutions were disposed of in this way. Most of these district court
misdemeanor pleas did not involve a recorded plea bargain, although
they required the prosecutor's approval. A few felony defendants (1%)
had their charges reduced to misdemeanors and were tried by a district
court judge; half of these were acquitted.
A grand jury considered the cases of 52.2% of the defendants shown
in Figure 1. Very few defendants, 0.6% of the total, were discharged by
the grand jury's refusal to issue an indictment. The rest, 51.6%, were
indicted and proceeded to superior court. At this point, a defendant's
chance of having all charges dismissed was much lower than it had been
in district court; only 8.0% of all defendants, 15.5% of those indicted,
were so fortunate.1 3 The most common outcome in superior court-
accounting for 37.8% of all defendants and 73.3% of the indicted defend-
ants-was a guilty plea. Usually this plea was part of a plea bargain
whose terms were recorded on a form designed for that purpose. Most
guilty pleas in superior court were to felony charges.
Only 5.8% of all the felony defendants described in Figure 1 re-
ceived complete jury trials. Jury trials were rare and risky; conviction
was four times as likely as acquittal, and the offense of conviction was
almost always a felony rather than a misdemeanor.
Nearly two-thirds (63.7%) of all the felony defendants were eventu-
ally convicted; 32.5% of the total were convicted of felonies, and 31.2%
were convicted only of misdemeanors (see Table 3). The district attor-
ney dismissed all the felony charges of 27.4% of the defendants without
further prosecution, and another 6.5% had all felony charges dismissed
by a judge, producing an overall dismissal rate of 33.9%. The remaining
2.4% received trial acquittals, "no true bills" (discharges by the grand
jury), or "prayer for judgment continued" (PJC).
1 4
What about sentences? About one-third (36.3%) of the 1,378 felony
defendants in the twelve counties were not convicted of any charge and
thus received no sentence. Twenty-seven and four-tenths percent re-
ceived active sentences-22.3% in the form of regular prison
13 Most of the superior court dismissals were by the prosecutor.
14 A tiny proportion of the felony defendants (0.2%) received the dispostion of "PJC"
("prayer for judgment continued") in district court, and these dispositions were counted as
dismissals. A "PJC" is a suspended imposition of sentence. State v. Miller, 225 N.C. 213,
215, 34 S.E. 2d 143, 144 (1945). It usually involves a plea of guilty by the defendant to a
charge (in district court this would be a misdemeanor charge), after which the judge
postpones imposition of sentence, sometimes on certain specific conditions. If the conditions
are no more than payment of court costs, the PJC is not a judgment, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
101(4a) (1978); if other conditions are imposed, it operates as a kind of probation without
conviction. Although the judge may impose a sentence later if the defendant violates the









Voluntary dismissal by prosecutor 25.2 (347)
Dismissal with leave by prosecutor 2.2 (30)
Dismissal by judge 6.5 (89)
Prayer for judgment continued ("PJC") 0.2 (3)
Grand jury refused to indict ("No True Bill") 0.6 (8)
Plea bargain on record 32.7 (451)
Other guilty plea 25.9 (357)
Trial acquittal 1.7 (23)
Trial conviction 5.1 (70)
ALL DISMISSALS (includes 3 "P JCs") 34.0 (469)
ALL CONVICTIONS INCLUDING GUILTY
PLEAS AND TRIALS 63.7 (878)
Conviction of felony 32.5 (448)
Conviction of misdemeanor only 31.2 (430)
ALL TRIALS 6.8 (93)
2. Type of Sentence
Total 100.0 (1,378)
No conviction 36.3 (500)
Fine and/or costs 3.7 (51)
Restitution or restitution plus fine 0.4 (6)
Unsupervised probation 7.1 (98)
Supervised probation 25.1 (346)
Special probation (active time plus probation) 5.1 (70)
Active imprisonment 22.3 (307)*
25th 75th
N Mean Median Percentile Percentile
3. Total active minimum prison
term for defendants who
received active time (in
years) 377* 3.62 0.67 0.00 4.00
4. Total active maximum
prison term for defendants
who received active time
(in years) 377* 7.14 3.00 0.50 7.00
*Active imprisonment in this table is not reduced by credit for pretrial detention. When




terms and 5.1% in the form of special probation (see Table 3).15 An-
other 25.1% received supervised probation without imprisonment, and
7.1% received unsupervised probation. Four and one-tenth percent re-
ceived neither probation nor prison but were ordered to pay a fine, court
costs, or restitution.
For the 377 defendants who received active prison sentences, 16 the
median length of the maximum prison term was 3.0 years and the me-
dian length of the minimum prison term was 0.7 years. The mean maxi-
mum sentence was 7.1 years and the mean minimum sentence was 3.6
years. Only 25% of the maximum sentences exceeded seven years.
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D. PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SENTENCING
Plea bargaining is firmly established in North Carolina. Legisla-
tion enacted in 1974 recognized the legitimacy of plea bargaining and
set some rules governing the practice. 18 The prosecution and defense
may discuss the possiblity that the prosecutor "will not charge, will dis-
miss, or will move for the dismissal of other charges, or will recommend
or not oppose a particular sentence" in exchange for the defendant's
plea of guilty to one or more charges. 19 The trial judge is authorized to
participate in these discussions.20 Before accepting a guilty plea pursu-
ant to a plea bargain in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend
a particular sentence, the judge must advise the parties whether he ap-
proves of the bargain and will sentence the defendant accordingly. If
the judge does not approve, neither the prosecution nor the defendant is
15 Special probation is a suspended sentence with up to six months to serve in jaii or
prison as a condition of the suspension, usually followed by a period of probation supervision.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1351(a), -1343(b)(16) (1978).
16 Lest these prison sentences seem lenient, it should be remembered that not all were
imposed for felony convictions-26% were imposed for misdemeanor convictions.
17 It should be remembered that the full maximum sentence would rarely have been
served, because of parole and credit for good behavior. Unpublished data recently obtained
by the authors from the North Carolina Department of Correction concerning adult felons
who were released from prison in 1981 indicate that the average felon served from one-fourth
to one-third of his maximum sentence.
18 The intent of the 1974 legislation, according to the Criminal Code Commssion's official
commentary, was "to bring plea negotiations out of the back room and put them on the
record." N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15A, art. 58. Much variation in North Carolina plea bargain-
ing practice has been noted in two previous studies. See Bond, Plea Bargaining in North Caro-
lina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 823 (1976); Lefstein, Plea Bargaining and the Trial Judge, the New ABA
Standards, and the Need to Contro/Judicial Discretion, 59 N.C.L. REV. 477, 489-94 (1981). New
determinate sentencing legislation, not effective until after the study described here, could
increase plea bargaining regarding the sentence, because it makes a plea-bargained sentence
exempt from the requirement that the judge give written reasons for a non-presumptive fel-
ony sentence. See Comment, Cr'minal Procedure-The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60
N.C.L. REV. 631, 643 (1982).




bound by the bargain; the defendant is then entitled to a postponement
until the next session of court, when a new judge is presiding, and the
parties may resume negotiations and try again.
2 1
Of the 1,378 felony defendants in our twelve-county sample, 808
(58.6%) pled guilty to at least one charge; 28.2% pled guilty to at least
one felony, and 30.4% pled guilty only to misdemeanors (see Table 4).
Thus, more than half of the guilty pleas involved felony-to-misdemeanor
charge reductions.
TABLE 4
TWELVE-COUNTY SAMPLE: PLEA BARGAINING AND
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Percentage of Defendants Who Pled Guilty to Misdemeanors or Felonies
Percentage Number
No plea 41.4 (570)
Plea to misdemeanor 30.4 (419)
Plea to felony 28.2 (389)
Total 100.0 (1378)





Percentage (Number) Percentage (Number)
Plea to misdemeanor 44.6 (187) 55.4 (232) (419)
Plea to felony 67.9 (264) 32.1 (125) (389)
Total 55.8 (451) 44.2 (357) (808)
3. Sentence Recommendations for Guilty Pleas to Either Misdemeanors or
Felonies
Percentage Number
Specific sentence recommended 27.0 (218)
in written plea bargain
No specific sentence 28.8 (233)
recommended in written
plea bargain
Plea without written bargain 44.2 (357)
Total 100.0 (808)






4. Consolidation for Judgment Recommendations for Guilty Pleas to Either
Misdemeanors or Felonies
Percentage Number
Consolidation for judgment 6.2 (50)
recommended in written
bargain
No consolidation for judgment 22.2 (179)
recommended in written
bargain
No companion cases 27.5 (222)
Plea without written bargain 44.2 (357)
Total 100.0 (808)
5. Sentence Recommendations for Defendants Who Pled Guilty to Felonies
Written Plea With or
Bargain Without Written
Bargain
Percentage (Number) Percentage (Number)
Specific sentence 54.9 (145) 37.3 (145)
recommendation in written
plea bargain
Consolidation of charges for 18.6 (49) 12.6 (49)
judgment in written plea
bargain
Total defendants who pled 100.0 (264) 100.0 (389)
guilty to felonies
Of the 808 defendants who pled guilty, 451 (55.8%) did so pursuant
to a written plea bargain-a recorded statement of a guilty plea and its
terms and conditions. These written terms and conditions included the
concessions granted by the state for the guilty plea; for example, the
state would agree to accept a plea to a reduced charge, to dismiss a
companion charge, or to recommend a particular sentence. The rest of
the guilty pleas, 44.2%, did not involve a quid pro quo expressed in a
written statement. But our count of written plea bargains conserva-
tively estimates the number of quidpro quo situations. Many of the other
guilty pleas probably involved unwritten understandings between the
defendant and the prosecutor or the judge.
Of the defendants who pled guilty pursuant to a written plea bar-
gain, 44.6% pled only to misdemeanors (see Table 4). Of those who pled
guilty without a written bargain, a greater proportion, 55.4%, received a
felony-to-misdemeanor reduction.
The data show a strong association between the dismissal of com-
1983)
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panion 22 charges and pleading guilty pursuant to a written bargain,
which suggests that multiple charges were a major advantage to the
prosecution. Of the 419 defendants who pled guilty to misdemeanors,
most were charged with only one felony. Consequently, only a small
proportion of these defendants had companion charges dismissed. Ta-
ble 5 shows the relationship between guilty pleas and dismissal of com-
panion charges. The 389 defendants who pled guilty to one or more
felonies were more likely to have companion charges, especially the 264
who pled guilty to a felony in a written plea bargain (of whom 63.6%
had companion charges). Of these 264 defendants, 9.1% had one or
more companion charges dismissed in district court, and 40.5% had
companion charges dismissed in superior court. Of the 168 defendants
who (1) had companion felony charges and (2) pled guilty in a written
bargain to one or more felonies, many had companion charges dis-
missed-14.3% in district court and 63.7% in superior court. Most of
these dismissals were part of the bargain.
2 3
What about plea bargains regarding the sentence? Of the 808 fel-
ony defendants who pled guilty to some charge, 27.0% did so pursuant
to a written plea bargain in which the prosecutor agreed to recommend
a specific length or type of sentence (see Table 4), and 6.2% did so in a
written bargain in which the prosecutor agreed to recommend consoli-
dation for judgment of one or more companion felony charges with the
principal felony charge.
2 4
Considering just the 389 defendants who pled guilty to felonies (see
Table 4), 12.6% agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's
written agreement to consolidate two or more of their charges for judg-
ment, and 37.3% had the prosecutor's written agreement to recommend
a specific sentence. Of the 264 defendants who pled guilty to a felony
pursuant to a written plea bargain, 54.9% did so in exchange for a prose-
cutor's recommendation of a specific sentence, with approval by the
22 If a defendant had other felony charges besides his principal charge, we called these
"companion felony charges."
23 A total of 157 defendants pled guilty to some charge pursuant to a written plea bargain
and also had companion charges dismissed. In 116 (74%) of these written plea bargains, the
dismissal of companion charges was specifically mentioned as a condition of the bargain.
24 Consolidating the charges for judgment limits the sentence severity: if a prison sen-
tence is imposed for the consolidated charges, it must be a single term no longer than the
longest maximum authorized for any of the charges. State v. McCrowe, 272 N.C. 523, 524,
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judge. 25 Another 18.6% of these 264 defendants received the prosecu-
tor's written agreement to consolidate two or more charges for
judgment.
IV. MODELS OF COURT DISPOSITIONS
A. MODELLING STRATEGY
We used multiple regression to develop statistical models of the pro-
cess that led to various trial court dispositions. Having hypothesized
that a number of relationships could exist between various factors pres-
ent in felony cases and the outcomes of prosecution, we then tested and
measured all of these possible relationships simultaneously. The tests
confirmed or supported some relationships; others were found not to be
statistically significant and were rejected.
Separate analyses were done of defendants charged with the two
most common types of felonies: Class 1-violent felonies-accounted
for 24% of the defendants in the twelve-county sample; and Class 2-
burglary, breaking or entering, larceny, and possession and receiving of
stolen goods-accounted for 46% of the defendants. We expected that
separate analyses would generate better estimates of various factors' ef-
fects on court disposition, because the type of offense charged could in-
fluence the impact of other factors.
When a defendant had more than one felony charge, his charges
may have received different dispositions by the court. As the defend-
ant's disposition, we chose the worst disposition received (from the de-
fendant's point of view); the charge receiving the worst disposition was
called the "principal" charge. We divided court dispositions into two
primary categories--dismissal and sentencing. Dismissal simply meant
that all of the defendant's felony charges were dismissed, usually by the
prosecutor, and that no conviction of any charge resulted, not even a
misdemeanor reduced from a felony. In the model, we used the logit
(the logarithm of the odds) of dismissal as the dependent variable and
employed a maximum likelihood method.
26
Sentences were determined for all defendants who pled guilty to
25 Of the 264 defendants who pled guilty to a felony with a written plea bargain, 25.4%
received probation as recommended by the prosecutor as part of the bargain, and 29.5%
received active prison sentences as recommended by the prosecutor. In collecting data on
plea arrangements in which the state agreed to recommend a particular sentence, we counted
only those that were approved by the sentencing judge pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1023(b) (1978).
26 The odds of an event occurring (or the "odds ratio") are equal to the probability of its
occurring divided by the probability of itsnot occurring. For example, if an event occurs with
probablity .8, the odds of its occurrence are .8/.2 = 4, or "4 to ." The maximum likelihood
estimation procedure is explained in McFadden, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice
Behavior, in FRONTIERS IN FcONOMETRICS 105 (Zaremka ed. 1973). We used the LOGIST
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any felony or reduced misdemeanor or were convicted at trial, as well as
the very few (twenty-three out of 1,378 defendants) who went to trial
and were acquitted. The acquitted defendants were considered to have
received "zero sentences" so that our analysis could account for the pos-
sible benefits as well as the possible disadvantages of going to trial rather
than pleading guilty.
The sentence imposed on the defendant was expressed in three
ways: (1) the odds27 in favor of receiving any active imprisonment, (2)
the total active maximum prison term imposed, and (3) the time until
earliest possible release from prison on the term imposed. 28 When the
defendant was either acquitted at trial or received a sentence involving
no active imprisonment, both his total active maximum prison term and
his time to earliest possible release from prison were considered to be
zero.
The time to earliest possible release from prison on the defendant's
sentence may be the best of our three measures of sentence severity.
Presumably most defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges understand
the basic rules of serving prison terms and take these rules into account
in bargaining about the sentence. Conversations with practitioners sug-
gest that the time to earliest release from prison may be the "coinage" of
plea bargaining, because felony defendants considering a plea bargain
involving imprisonment are most interested in how soon they may be
released from prison.
In order not to confuse the effects of administrative variables with
the effects of basic factors in the regression analysis, we used a hierarchi-
cal approach. First, the dependent variable in logarithm form was re-
gressed on the basic factors; these included personal characteristics of
procedure in the SAS language. See Harrell, The LOGISTProcedure, in THE SAS SUPPLEMEN-
TAL LIBRARY USER's GUIDE 3 (Reinhardt ed. 1980).
27 See supra note 26.
28 In the models of the last two sentence variables, the logarithms rather than the actual
values were used to reduce the distorting effects of a few very severe sentences. One month
was added to each value before computing its logarithm. If the defendant received a prison
sentence, the time to earliest release from prison was computed as the least amount of time he
could serve in prison before either becoming eligible for parole or being unconditionally dis-
charged, whichever would come first. In a few instances, an inmate could be unconditionally
discharged before becoming eligible for parole. When a defendant sentenced to imprison-
ment became eligible for parole immediately, we assigned a value of two months to his time
or earliest release to allow for minimum administrative delay. (North Carolina's laws of pa-
role eligibility are in N.C. GEN.'STAT. §§ 15A-1371 to 1380.2, 148-49.15 (1978 & Supp.
1981).) The total maximum prison term was computed by selecting the longest of any group
of concurrent prison terms, adding any consecutive terms, and then subtracting the time the
defendant spent in pretrial detention, for which he must receive credit under N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 15, art. 19A (1978). When the defendant received a nonprison sentence or was




the defendant-such as age, race, and sex-as well as aspects of the legal
case against him--charge, criminal record, evidence, and victim-defend-
ant relationships. 29 Next, basic factors not associated with the depen-
dent variable at least at the .05 level were excluded. Then the
dependent variable was regressed on the remaining basic factors plus
administrative variables to form two additional models: (1) the "com-
plete" model (including detention time, a binary attorney variable [as-
signed versus all other categories], and, if the dependent variable was
sentence severity, whether the defendant went to trial or pled guilty);
and (2) the "attorney differences" model (including a five-level attorney
variable but excluding detention time and plea/trial). Before comput-
ing each model, we tested for multicollinearity; each independent varia-
ble was regressed using ordinary least squares on all other independent
variables, and if the resulting R2 exceeded .5, the variable was removed.
In fact, the administrative variables (detention, attorney, and plea/trial)
proved to have very little correlation with other independent variables.
Table 6 combines the results of all of these models, indicating the
effects that tested significant at the .05 level, expressed as percentage




I Defendant's Charge and Codefendants
As expected, the defendant's charge or charges and any codefen-
dants influenced the final disposition. The seriousness of the initial prin-
cipal charge, which we measured as the maximum prison term allowed
by law for the offense, did not affect the odds that all of the defendant's
charges would be dismissed, but it did significantly affect the severity of
the sentence imposed on the defendant who pled guilty or went to trial.
The sentence generally became more severe as the seriousness of the
charge increased, for both Class I and Class 2 defendants (see Table 6).
As more felony charges were initially filed against the Class I or Class 2
defendant, the odds that all charges would be dismissed decreased, and
the likely severity of the sentence increased. We thought that the pres-
ence of codefendants would make dismissal more likely for each defend-
ant, on the theory that there were more suspects available to "take the
29 Although the county or prosecution was in a sense an administrative variable, it could
not be "caused by" any other factor. It was included in the basic factors model.
30 These percentages are actually the antilogarithms of the unstandardized coefficients,
minus one. All binary independent variables had the value one when a condition was present
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CLARKE AND KURTZ
rap." We found the presence of codefendants to be significantly associ-
ated with greater odds of dismissal for Class 1, but not Class 2,
defendants.
2. Defendant's Prior Criminal Record
A defendant's prior criminal record was not significantly associated
with the likelihood that all charges would be dismissed, but it was asso-
ciated with severity of the sentence he received if the charges were not
dismissed. Being on probation or parole at the time of prosecution
meant a much greater chance of receiving an active prison sentence for
Class 2, but not Class 1, defendants. It also meant a longer maximum
prison term and longer time to serve before earliest possible release from
prison for both Class 1 and Class 2 defendants. Finally, the number of
prior convictions was positively associated with severity of sentence; the
more prior convictions, the greater the odds that a defendant would re-
ceive an active prison sentence. Moreover, for Class 2 defendants, as the
number of prior convictions increased, so would the length of the likely
prison term and the time to earliest possible release from prison.3'
3. Defendant's Social and Economic Characteristics
The defendant's age evidently had little impact on the court's final
disposition. The only clear effect of age was that defendants aged
twenty-one to twenty-five received more severe sentences than defend-
ants under twenty-one, not with respect to their likelihood of receiving
an active prison term or the length of their maximum prison term, but
with respect to the time to earliest release from prison.32 Notably, other
age groups-defendants twenty-six to thirty and those over thirty-did
not differ significantly from those under twenty-one, with two excep-
tions: those over thirty in Class 2 were more likely to have their charges
dismissed, and those over thirty in Class 1 were more likely to avoid
imprisonment than those under twenty-one.
The chance that a defendant's charges would be dismissed was not
significantly associated with the defendant's race, but if he was charged
with a Class 2 offense, sentence severity was associated with race. Black
Class 2 defendants received significantly more severe sentences than
white Class 2 defendants; black defendants had a 73% greater chance of
receiving a prison sentence, a 57% longer total maximum prison term,
31 Prior convictions were determined from the court records pertaining to the county of
prosecution and also from local police files; the latter sometimes indicated convictions outside
the county, but not consistently. These records were the best available indication of what the
parties in the case knew about the defendant's prior convictions at the time of prosecution.
32 Defendants under age 21 at the time of conviction could be sentenced as "committed
youthful offenders," which would make them eligible for parole immediately. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 148-49.10 to -49.16 (1978).
[Vol. 74
INTERIM DECISIONS
and a 26% longer time to earliest release from prison.33
Black defendants suffered a disadvantage in sentencing apparently
because blacks charged with Class 2 felonies, but not those charged with
Class 1 felonies, were more likely than whites to have court-assigned
rather than privately paid lawyers and spent a longer time in pretrial
detention.34 When type of counsel and detention time were added to
the regression model for Class 2 defendants (see Table 6), the race effect
disappeared. As a result, what at first appeared to be a racial effect may
actually be due to blacks' lower incomes, which would have limited the
type of counsel available to them and their opportunity for pretrial
release.
35
Other demographic characteristics, including the defendant's sex,
marital status, residence within or outside the county of prosecution,
and employment status, showed no significant relationship to court
disposition.
4. Evidence Against the Defendant
A defendant charged with a Class 1 or Class 2 felony was signifi-
cantly less likely to have all charges dismissed if (1) the prosecution
could call an eyewitness or (2) the defendant had confessed or made an
incriminating statement. Also, having confessed or having made an in-
criminating statement was associated with less severe sentences for Class
2 defendants. One possible explanation for this association is that a con-
fession, like a guilty plea, may be regarded as a sign of contrition and
therefore may lead the sentencing judge to reduce the defendant's
sentence.
33 These estimated race effects are not shown in Table 6 for reasons explained in the next
paragraph.
34 See in/ia notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
35 No reliable data on defendants' incomes were available in the court and police records.
The data on type of counsel and pretrial detention suggest that blacks' disadvantages were at
least partly attributable to lower incomes. Among Class 2 defendants whose charges were not
dismissed, the proportions who had assigned counsel were as follows: blacks, 81.6% (N=217);
whites, 51.7% (N=207). The mean pretrial detention times for Class 2 defendants whose
charges were not dismissed were: blacks, 27.1 days (N=2 11); whites, 12.8 days (N= 198). We
did not find such discrepancies between black and white defendants in Class 1. Among Class
1 defendants whose charges were not all dismissed, 63.6% of blacks had assigned counsel,
compared with 67.1% of whites, and blacks spent an average of 32.7 days in pretrial deten-
tion, compared with 35.3 days for whites. One reason why the disparity in detention times
between blacks and whites occurred in Class 2 but not in Class 1 may be that, in Class 2,
blacks were, on the average, poorer than whites, but not in Class 1. We have no direct data on
defendants' incomes; however, the figures just mentioned show that, for purposes of assigning
counsel, in Class 2 the percentage of black defendants found indigent was greater than the
percentage of white defendants who were found indigent, but the two percentages were ap-
proximately equal in Class 1. Another reason for the absence of the disparity in pretrial
detention between blacks and whites in Class 1 may be that Class I (violent) felony charges
were so serious that they overcame both blacks' disadvantages and whites' advantages.
1983]
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For violent felony defendants in Class 1, the existence of any sort of
physical evidence meant both a lower chance of dismissal and a more
severe sentence. If the crime resulted in substantial physical injury to
the victim beyond the minimum amount necessary to sustain the
charge, the chance that Class 1 charges would be dismissed was reduced,
-but the effect on sentencing was nil.36 The recovery by the police of
stolen property and the extent of the property loss caused by the crime
had no significant effect on either dismissal or severity of sentence. It
should be remembered, however, that physical injury and property loss
were to some extent correlated with the severity of the initial charge
against the defendant, which did have an effect on sentencing, as ex-
plained above.
The regression analysis also indicated that for violent felonies, the
defendant who had not used a weapon could expect a much more severe
sentence; this defendant would likely be sentenced to lengthy imprison-
ment. Such a result seems absurd-the absence of a weapon would
seem to be a mitigating, not aggravating factor. This peculiar result,
however, is probably due to the particular type of violent offense
charged. Class 1 defendants who did not use any weapon were much
more likely than weapon-using violent felony defendants to have been
charged with and convicted of rape, common law robbery, and arson or
other burning crimes, which legally do not require a weapon. Defend-
ants convicted of such crimes were more likely to receive prison
sentences, and longer ones, than most other violent felony defendants.
5 Characteristics of the Victim
The chance that the Class 2 defendant's charge would be dropped
increased if the defendant was related to or acquainted with the victim.
We anticipated that the criminal court would tend to treat more leni-
ently defendants who had some pre-existing relationship with their vic-
tims, because related victims would generally have been more reluctant
to testify against the defendant than would unrelated victims, and also
because a pre-existing relationship would have been associated with ex-
tenuating circumstances favorable to the defendant. Thus, we expected
to find that such a relationship would work to the defendant's advan-
tage in violent felony (Class 1) cases as well as in theft felony (Class 2)
36 Determination of whether substantial physical harm was alleged was based on police
and court records and was somewhat subjective. Coders were instructed to try to determine
whether the degree of physical harm was substantially in excess of the minimum amount
necessary to prove the elements of the offense charged. If homicide was charged, the killing
had to be extremely brutal or cruel for the harm to be coded as "substantial." In other words,
our intent was to measure a degree of harm more severe than that implied by the charge
itself. It may be that the lack of statistical association between our physical harm variable
and sentencing severity is simply due to inadequate information.
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cases. Yet, we could confirm this effect only in the latter category.
Nonetheless, victim-defendant relationships in Class 1 cases may have
had an effect that was expressed at the initial decision about what crime
to charge, which we did not study, rather than at the later decision to
dismiss charges.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS
1. County in Which Prosecution Occurred
The statistical analysis of the association between court disposition
and county of prosecution illustrates that within the single jurisdiction
of North Carolina local administrative practices and policies cause sub-
stantial variation in defendants' final dispositions. Previous studies of
North Carolina support this point.
3 7
Charges against both Class 1 and Class 2 defendants were generally
more likely to be dismissed in Mecklenburg and Buncombe counties
than in the other ten counties studied, when differences in the character-
istics of cases were controlled for statistically. The greater dismissal
rates in these two counties suggest that there was something distinctive
about the handling of felony cases there. 38 The distinctive characteristic
may well have been that their prosecutors, unlike prosecutors in the
other ten counties, used formal systems to screen felony charges soon
after arrest.
3 9
37 Prosecutors' plea bargaining practices vary widely from district to district in North
Carolina. See Bond, supra note 18, at 823, and Lefstein, supra note 18, at 489-94.
38 Another factor may have been that in Buncombe County, the rate of dismissals of
felonies by district court judges was high-5.6%, compared with 5.9% for all twelve counties.
Does prosecutorial workload explain the higher dismissal rates in Buncombe and Mecklen-
burg counties? Perhaps, but only partly. Three measures of workload were developed:
(1) the number of arrests for F.B.I. "index" crimes per prosecuting attorney; (2) the estimated
number of felony arrests per prosecuting attorney; and (3) the total arrests per prosecuting
attorney. These three measures, computed for 1979, produced very similar rankings for the
twelve judicial/prosecutorial districts in which the twelve counties were located. Workload
indices were then created by computing the ratio of each district's workload measure to the
workload of District 1 which generally had the lowest workload measures. District 28 had the
highest workload index; its felony arrests per prosecutor were 2.6 times as great as those of
District 1. The workload of Mecklenburg County, District 26, however, was not especially
high. It had a felony arrest workload 1.7 times as great as that of District 1, which placed it
"in the middle of the pack" with respect to the twelve counties. Also, one might suppose that
New Hanover County's low dismissal rate was the product of an exceptionally low
prosecutorial workload, but this did not prove to be the case; the felony arrest workload of
District 5, including New Hanover County, was 1.9 times as great as District l's.
39 New Hanover County's prosecution was distinctive in another way. Its prosecutors
dismissed only 10.1% of the felony defendants' charges at the district court stage, compared
with 20.2% in all twelve counties. Of New Hanover's defendants 76.7% went to the grand
jury and superior court, compared with 51.6% in all twelve counties. Its felony guilty plea
rate was higher than the rate for all twelve counties (40.1% compared with 27.4%), and its
jury trial rate was nearly twice as high as the twelve-county rate (10.6% compared with 5.8%).
But although tougher prosecution in New Hanover County apparently produced more con-
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2. Pretrial Detention
As the Class 1 or Class 2 defendant spent more time in detention
awaiting court disposition, it became less likely that the charges would
be dismissed and more likely that the sentence would be severe. This
result agrees with much research in other jurisdictions.
40
Several factors may explain the link between pretrial detention and
court disposition. First, 4' the defendant who is free before court disposi-
tion has certain potential advantages that the jailed defendant lacks:
acquiring or maintaining a job, making restitution to the victim, and
doing other things that may favorably impress the court. The free de-
fendant can also help the defense attorney by obtaining favorable wit-
nesses and evidence. All of these things will help the accused argue for
dismissal, a beneficial plea bargain, or a lenient sentence. As the length
of pretrial detention increases, the defendant is less likely to be able to
do these advantageous things. In addition, it will be harder for his at-
torney to see the accused in jail-the lawyer will have to take valuable
time to go to the jail, where there is often neither proper space nor at-
mosphere for a conference. Finally, the defendant may be more willing
to accept a disadvantageous plea bargain offer after having spent a long
time in jail.
Another factor contributing to the association between pretrial de-
tention and the type of disposition the defendant receives is that releas-
ing the defendant before disposition may weaken the prosecution by
intimidating potential state's witnesses. But such intimidation probably
victions, the regression analysis indicated that sentences were not significantly more severe for
those convicted.
40 Early studies showed that defendants released before trial were more likely to receive
favorable court disposition than defendants who were not released, but these studies failed to
control for other factors that might explain both detention and disposition. See Ares, Rankin
& Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project.- An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L.
RE'. 67 (1963); Foote, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv.
693 (1958); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954); Rankin, The E ect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641 (1964);
Single, The Unconstitutional Administration of Bail. Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 gRIM.
L. BULL. 459 (1972). William Landes' study was the first to (a) control carefully for other
potential causal factors and (b) analyze the time in detention as well as whether the defendant
was released. His study of New York City defendants found that pretrial detention time was
positively associated with sentence length. See Landes, Legality and Reality. Some Evidence on
Criminal Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 333-35 (1974). John S. Goldkamp, also using a
multivariate technique, found in his analysis of Philadelphia cases that defendants who re-
ceived no pretrial release were more likely to go to prison if convicted, and tended to receive a
longer sentence, than those who did receive release. Goldkamp did not consider the time
spent in detention. See Goldkamp, The Efects of Detention on Judicial Decisions: A Closer Look,
253 Jus. Sys. J. 234, 245 (1980).
41 Our source for this explanation is conversations with defense attorneys in North Caro-
lina, as well as AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.1 and commentary (2d ed. 1980).
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occurs only in a few cases involving serious violent crimes or defendants
reputed to be dangerous. Many released defendants may be tempted to
intimidate witnesses but are probably deterred from doing so by fear of
exacerbating their position.
A third consideration is that the relationship between pretrial de-
tention and court disposition could be explained by other factors-such
as the defendant's charge or criminal history or the strength of the evi-
dence against him-that affect both the conditions of pretrial release
(such as the bail bond) and the defendant's eventual disposition. 42 This
is a plausible explanation, but our data did not support it. We found
that very little of the variation in pretrial detention time could be ex-
plained by seriousness of charge, prior convictions, evidence, and similar
variables. In other words, it was common for two defendants to be alike
with respect to charge, prior convictions, and other relevant criteria, but
to spend very different amounts of time in pretrial detention. This point
is illustrated by Table 7, which will be discussed presently.
Our analysis suggests that there was simply a good deal of random
variation in the setting of pretrial release conditions. That such varia-
tion could occur is not surprising. Decisions about pretrial release con-
ditions are made by a number of different officials (usually magistrates),
are not closely supervised, and are almost never reviewed by appellate
courts. Also, there is probably much random variation in the time re-
quired for courts to arrive at their final dispositions, which also affects
the length of time spent in jail by detained defendants.
43
Even though we found little relationship between pretrial detention
time and other basic factors, our analysis was designed to neutralize the
possible contribution of other factors. We measured the effects of pre-
trial detention, controlling for seriousness of charge, prior convictions, evi-
dence against the defendant, and other variables that might possibly
affect both pretrial detention and court disposition.
42 If the defendant has a serious charge or an extensive criminal history or if there is
strong evidence against him, the magistrate may tend to set a high secured bail bond, and in
later hearings the prosecutor may recommend either that a higher bond be set or that the
original bond not be reduced. These same factors (serious charge, extensive record, and
strong evidence) may also make it unlikely that the prosecutor will dismiss the defendant's
charge and increase the probability that the defendant will receive a substantial active
sentence.
43 Another reason why the variation in pretrial detention could not be statistically ex-
plained well with our data is that our data-limited to court and police records-did not
include all the information that in fact determined the pretrial release decision. To the extent
that we inadvertently omitted legally relevant information from our data, our study was in-
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The regression analysis indicated that each additional ten days of
pretrial detention corresponds to lower odds of dismissal of all charges.
The odds of dismissal were an estimated 17% lower per ten days deten-
tion for Class 1 defendants and 10% lower per ten days detention for
Class 2 defendants. Each ten days of detention was also associated with
increased sentence severity; this was reflected in higher odds of receiving
an active sentence, a longer maximum prison term, and a longer time to
earliest release from prison (see Table 6). Thus, the regression analysis
tells us that when two defendants and their cases were alike, but one
defendant spent more time in pretrial detention than the other, the for-
mer defendant was less likely to have his charges dismissed than the
latter and was also more likely to receive a stiffer sentence if convicted.
The relationship between detention time and court disposition is
illustrated in Table 7.44 In the table, Class 2 defendants are divided into
low, moderate, and high "risk groups," depending on the likelihood of
dismissal, probablity of receiving an active sentence, expected maxi-
mum prison term, and expected time to earliest release from prison, as
predicted from such basic factors as the seriousness of their charges, their
criminal record, and the type of evidence against them. Within each
"risk group," defendants were further divided into subgroups depending
on how much time they spent in pretrial detention: "none" (or up to
one day); "low" (not exceeding the overall median time of fifteen days);
and "high" (more than fifteen days). Table 7 shows the totals in each
group and subgroup in parentheses. An inspection of the subgroup
totals indicates that, although high-risk defendants tended to receive
longer pretrial detention, a substantial number of high-risk defendants
spent little time in pretrial detention. Conversely, a substantial number
of low-risk defendants spent much time in pretrial detention. This illus-
trates the point made earlier that similarly-situated defendants may
spend quite different amounts of time in detention. Within each risk
group, as detention time increased, (1) the. proportion of defendants
whose charges were dismissed decreased, and (2) the three measures of
severity of sentence generally increased. The most pronounced differ-
ences can be seen by comparing high detention-time defendants with all
other defendants in each risk group.
3. Type of Attomey
We hypothesized that a felony defendant would tend to be at a
disadvantage if represented by assigned counsel rather than by private
counsel. In North Carolina, assigned counsel may be either a full-time
44 Table 7 deals only with defendants charged with Class 2 offenses. A similar table has
been prepared for Class I defendants. Although not published in this Article, it is similar to
Table 7 for purposes of the point made in this paragraph.
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• salaried public defender or an attorney in private practice individually
appointed by the court. 45 We suspected that privately retained defense
attorneys earned more, on the average, for their work than either indi-
vidually appointed counsel or public defenders. 46 Also, privately re-
tained attorneys may have had lower caseloads, and therefore could
spend more time per case, than assigned counsel. Finally, we thought
that privately retained counsel would tend to be more experienced than
assigned counsel.
In the "attorney differences" regression model, each of the two
forms of counsel for indigent defendants was compared with privately
retained counsel, and each was compared with the other.47 We ex-
pected that public defenders might prove more effective than individu-
ally appointed counsel because public defenders are full-time specialists
who have the support of an experienced organization, while individually
appointed lawyers may not do criminal work full-time and often do not
have the support of a specialized criminal defense firm.
48
We statistically compared the type of counsel with the defendant's
45 Attorneys are appointed pursuant to a plan adopted by the local district bar. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-459 (1981); North Carolina State Bar Council, Regulations Relating to the
Appointment of Counselfor Indigent Defendants in Certain Criminal Cases (N.C. GEN. STAT. Vol. 4A,
Appendix VIII, Art. IV).
46 The average individually-appointed attorney's fee in a criminal case was about $158 at
the time of our study. Annual Report of the [N.C] Administrative Ofjie of the Courts 1978-79, at
59-62 (1980). This figure would be somewhat higher if only felony cases were considered in
the computation. We have no information on the average private attorney's fees but believe
them to be much higher. The average yearly salary of public defenders and assistants in 1979
was about $26,000, according to the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
While the public defenders' salaries were on a par with those of prosecutors, they probably
earned less than many private defense attorneys. Also, attorneys whose work is mainly with
defendants who pay them privately may have lower caseloads than attorneys who represent
indigents and thus be able to spend more time per case.
47 As Table 6 indicates, having no attorney and having an unknown attorney status were
treated as separate factors in the statistical analysis. The analysis indicated that defendants
were much more likely to have all their charges dismissed if they had no attorney or if their
attorney status was unknown. This peculiar result is probably explained by the fact that when
a defendant's charges were dismissed early in the district court stage of processing, very often
either (a) there was not time to obtain an attorney, or (b) information on the attorney tended
to be missing from the court records, and hence the attorney status was coded "unknown."
48 A 1975 study by the North Carolina Bar Association Foundation found evidence that
public defenders were more effective than individually appointed counsel, with respect to
both conviction rates and the proportion of defendants receiving prison sentences. N.C. BAR
ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INDIGENT LE-
GAL SERVICES DELIVERY SYSTEMS (1976) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. The Special
Committee recommended a statewide criminal defense organization headed by a chief public
defender as part of a non-profit corporation providing both civil and criminal services to
indigents throughout the state. It also recommended that uniform fee schedules be set based
on the type of proceeding rather than the current hourly rate; that public defender branch
offices be implemented in urban areas where economically feasible; that the corporation
board determine which areas should have defender branch offices, an individually-appointed
counsel system, or a combination of the two; and that there be uniform financial guidelines
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disposition (see Table 6). The likelihood that all of a defendant's
charges would be dismissed was lower if the defendant was represented
by individually appointed counsel than if he was represented by pri-
vately retained counsel. For Class 1 defendants the odds were an esti-
mated 60% lower, and for Class 2 they were approximately 47% lower.
But the odds did not differ significantly between defendants represented
by a public defender and those represented by privately retained coun-
sel. With regard to severity of sentence, the type of attorney apparently
made no difference when the defendant was charged with a violent
Class 1 felony. The defendant charged with a Class 2 felony, such as
larceny or breaking or entering, was at a disadvantage in sentencing if
represented by either form of assigned counsel rather than privately
paid counsel; this defendant was more likely to receive a prison sentence,
to receive a longer maximum prison term, and to serve more time in
prison. The specific form of assigned counsel apparently did not affect
sentence severity. In other words, for both Class 1 and Class 2 defend-
ants, there were no significant sentence differences between those repre-
sented by individually appointed lawyers and those represented by
public defenders. Thus, the analysis suggests that public defenders were
more successful than individually appointed counsel in obtaining dis-
missals for felony defendants, but not in obtaining lenient sentences for
convicted defendants.
4. Trial Versus Pleading Guilty
We expected that defendants who chose to plead guilty rather than
go to trial would be likely to receive more lenient sentences because of
(1) charge reduction, (2) favorable sentence recommendations by the
prosecutor, or (3) favorable sentencing decisions by the judge. Conces-
sions in charge and sentence are frequently offered as inducements to
plead guilty and are recognized as legitimate forms of plea bargaining.
49
Conversely, we anticipated that the defendant who was convicted at
trial would tend to receive a more severe sentence than the one who pled
guilty, for several possible reasons. First, the tried defendant would be
denied the customary reward for pleading guilty; second, aggravating
for determining indigency. Id., Recommendations XVIII, XX, XXI, XXIII, and XXVI, at
23-32.
49 The ABA Standards approve concessions for pleading guilty, but only where (1) the
defendant is genuinely contrite, (2) the concession serves a rehabilitative purpose, (3) the
defendant demonstrates consideration for the victim, or (4) the defendant assists the prosecu-
tion of other offenders. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, (2d ed. 1980) § 14-1.8,
commentary at 14-17. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-53 (1970), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's granting a concession to the defendant who
"in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State" by pleading guilty. Id. at 753.
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factors could be brought out at trial that would not have emerged in
plea bargaining, or the defendant could be penalized for what was per-
ceived as lying testimony at trial; and finally, the court could tacitly
punish the defendant for exercising the right to trial. Punishing the de-
fendant for choosing a trial is clearly improper,50 but the everyday expe-
rience of criminal trial lawyers suggests that it occasionally occurs.
In fact, there was a marked contrast between plea and trial
sentences. For those Class 1 (violent felony) defendants who were con-
victed pursuant to a guilty plea, the proportion receiving active
sentences was 56%; for those convicted at trial, the active sentence pro-
portion was 77%. The median total maximum prison term was three
months for those who pled guilty and seventy-seven months for those
convicted at trial. Those Class 2 defendants who were convicted faced
an active sentence rate of 40% when they pled guilty and 91% when they
were convicted at trial. The median total active maximum prison term
was zero months for those who pled guilty and thirty-six months for
those convicted at trial. Apparently the more severe sentences for trial
convictions were not due simply to the fact that only high-risk defend-
ants went to trial. Regressing the decision to go to trial on "sentence
risk" variables such as charge and criminal record, we obtained R2 val-
ues of only .08 for Class 1 defendants and .09 for Class 2 defendants.
For this reason, we do not believe that the decision to go to trial de-
pended primarily on "sentence risk."
Further inspection of the data suggests that going to trial was asso-
ciated with more severe sentences when the defendant was in a moder-
ate- or high-risk group with respect to sentence severity. 51 Table 8
compares defendants who pled guilty to those who went to trial with
respect to three measures of sentence severity: (1) percentage sentenced
to active imprisonment; (2) mean total active prison term imposed; and
(3) mean time to earliest release from prison. Class 1 and Class 2 de-
fendants were compared separately and plea/trial comparisons were
made within each risk group.
50 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, (2d ed. 1980) § 14-1.8, commentary at 42-49. See
State v. Boone, 33 N.C. App. 378, 380-81, 235 S.E.2d 74, 77, aj'd, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d
459 (1977), which held that the defendant's right to trial was violated when the judge said on
the record that he was imposing an active prison sentence because the defendant had refused
to plead guilty, even though the judge was unfamiliar with the defendant's character and
record.
51 "Risk" was determined, as in Table 7, from the seriousness of the charge, criminal
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Most defendants who went to trial were in the moderate- or high-
risk categories. Thus low-risk defendants tended to plead guilty, and
moderate- and high-risk defendants were more likely to go to trial. This
suggests that low-risk defendants received more advantageous plea bar-
gain offers, while moderate- and high-risk defendants were less likely to
be offered an acceptable plea bargain and therefore were more likely to
take a chance on trial.
The sentence comparisons among low-risk defendants differed from
those for moderate- and high-risk defendants. In all six comparisons,
low-risk defendants who went to trial received somewhat less severe
sentences than those who pled guilty. In fact, they usually were acquit-
ted or received probation without imprisonment. For moderate- and
high-risk defendants, however, in eleven out of twelve comparisons de-
fendants who went to trial received more severe sentences, even account-
ing for the few who were acquitted. Table 8 suggests an interaction
effect: going to trial rather than pleading guilty may have meant a bet-
ter outcome for the defendant if he was originally in a low-risk category,
but a worse outcome if he was in a moderate- or high-risk category.
For a further test of the plea/trial sentence differential, 52 we re-
gressed the various measures of sentence severity on the variable
TRIAL, which was equal to one if the defendant completed a trial and
zero otherwise, plus variables from the "basic factors" model, as well as
pretrial detention time and type of counsel. In five out of six regression
models (see Table 6), TRIAL's coefficient did not test significantly dif-
ferent from zero. These results suggest that, contrary to the sentence
comparisons discussed above, there may have been no significant sen-
tence advantage for the defendant who pled guilty, nor a significant
sentence disadvantage for the defendant who went to trial. But we do
not regard the regression results as conclusive for two reasons. First, the
sample of defendants who went to trial was very small-only forty out of
182 in Class 1 and thirty-two out of 428 in Class 2. A larger sample
might have revealed a significant difference. Second, the positive effect
of trial on sentence severity for moderate- and high-risk defendants may
have been partly offset by a negative effect of trial on sentences for low-
risk defendants, as suggested by Table 8.
52 In our regression analysis of sentence severity, the test for a possible plea/trial differen-
tial was a conservative one, in the sense that it reflected the possible advantage of going to trial
as well as the possible disadvantage. The defendant who went to trial had the possible advan-
tage of being acquitted. We included in the model the few defendants acquitted at trial along




5. Comparison with Rhodes Study of Plea/Trial Sentence Dierential"
Further Refections
William Rhodes studied the dispositions in the Superior Court of
Washington, D.C. of arrests made in 1974.53 As in the present study,
Rhodes followed defendants from arrest to their final trial court disposi-
tion. In his four separate analyses of defendants initially charged with
robbery, larceny, burglary, and assault, Rhodes found a plea/trial sen-
tence differential only with regard to robbery defendants, and not with
respect to larceny, burglary, or assault defendants. Thus, his results were
quite different from ours.
The gross disposition rates of the Washington defendants were
quite different from the rates of the North Carolina defendants. The
dismissal rate (rejection plus nolle prosequi) ranged from 60 to 70% for
the groups of Washington defendants, while for the North Carolina fel-
ony defendants the dismissal rate was only 34%.54 Trial rates were
higher for the Washington defendants though, ranging from 9 to 11%, as
compared with about 6% for the North Carolina defendants. Further-
more, the ratio of guilty pleas to trials was much lower for the Washing-
ton defendants, ranging from a low of 1.75 to 1 to a high of 2.78 to 1,
compared with 8.33 to 1 for the North Carolina defendants. Prosecutors
in Washington apparently disposed of a much higher proportion of de-
fendants by dismissal than did North Carolina prosecutors, but the re-
maining defendants were much less likely to plead guilty thereafter and
more likely to go to trial. Perhaps Washington prosecutors, unlike
North Carolina prosecutors, gave defendants concessions "up front" by
using their power to dismiss charges, but having accepted a case for
prosecution, offered little inducement to plead guilty.
Rhodes compared sentences actually received by defendants who
pled guilty to sentences received by those who were convicted at trial.
For assault, larceny, and burglary defendants, Rhodes found almost no
plea/trial difference in the severity of sentences, either in terms of the
percentage receiving active prison sentences or in the length of active
sentences, although the sentences of robbery defendants who pled guilty
were considerably less severe than the sentences of those convicted at
trial.55 In contrast, the North Carolina data showed very large differ-
53 W. RHODES, PLEA BARGAINING: WHO GAINS? WHO LOSES? (1978); Rhodes, Plea Bar-
gaining. Its Effct on Sentencing and Convictions in the District of Columbia, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 360 (1979).
54 Note that Rhodes' "assault" and "larceny" categories probably included many charges
that would be misdemeanors in North Carolina and thus would be excluded from our study.
55 Rhodes speculates that the reason why robbery defendants' situation was different was
that they faced a high probability of active time if convicted at trial (about 75%) and thus
their counsel negotiated more earnestly for a plea bargaining concession affecting the sen-
tence. Assault, larceny, and burglary defendants, whose likelihood of an active sentence at
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ences between plea and trial sentences for all these kinds of offenses.
Rhodes developed a regression model for sentencing severity, ap-
plying it only to those defendants who were convicted at trial. He then
applied the model to defendants who pled guilty to estimate what
sentences they might have received had they gone to trial. He con-
cluded that (1) assault, larceny, and burglary defendants who pled
guilty would have received sentences of nearly equal severity had they
been convicted at trial, and (2) robbery defendants who pled guilty
would have received considerably more severe sentences had they been
convicted at trial. Rhodes' analysis indicates that Washington's
prosecutorial practices differ from those of North Carolina, where very
few felony defendants go to trial, and where those who choose trial may
incur a substantial penalty.
Our approach to measuring a plea/trial sentence differential, as al-
ready explained, was quite different from Rhodes'. We treated
plea/trial as a variable in analyzing sentencing for both guilty-pleading
and tried defendants. Although the plea/trial coefficient was not signifi-
cantly different from zero in the regression analysis, the comparison of
defendant subsamples matched for levels of "sentence risk" suggested
that for moderate- and high-risk groups, trial convictions resulted in
more severe sentences than guilty pleas.
If our interpretation that there was a penalty for going to trial in
North Carolina or a concession for pleading guilty is correct, then why
did any North Carolina defendants go to trial? Our answer to this ques-
tion is speculative. Perhaps a small proportion of those who chose trial
were in fact innocent and somehow failed to obtain dismissal of their
charges. Another small proportion might have had such strong cases
against them, such serious charges, and such serious criminal records
that the prosecutor left them no alternative to trial. We suspect, how-
ever, that most of those who chose trial did so not because of legally
relevant factors, but because of "chance" variations in plea bargaining
behavior by prosecutors or defense attorneys. In Washington, on the
other hand, where Rhodes' analysis showed no real concession for plead-
ing guilty except for robbery defendants, defendants were much more
likely to go to trial than were their North Carolina counterparts. Thus,
for Washington defendants, going to trial may often have been a delib-
erately chosen strategy.
56
trial was 22 to 50%, may have been less likely to struggle for a lenient sentence. See supra note
53.
56 An interesting question that neither the Washington study nor the North Carolina
study answers is what would happen to sentences if the number of defendants choosing trial
increased substantially. This might very well make sentences more lenient. For example, a
large increase in trial workload might force prosecutors to offer plea bargains much more
favorable to defendants or it might weaken the strength of prosecution at trial and thus lead
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V.' SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Our study of North Carolina felony defendants furnishes considera-
ble evidence that, while intrinsic and legally relevant characteristics of
the felony cases we studied affected their dispositions in trial courts, ad-
ministrative variables such as plea bargaining, pretrial detention, and
defense counsel service also affected the dispositions.
The likelihood that all of the defendant's felony charges would be
dismissed, and the sentence severity if all charges were not dismissed,
were correlated with basic characteristics of the case. For example, the
analysis showed that the defendant's odds of dismissal of all charges
were considerably less when an eyewitness was available to testify for the
prosecution or when the defendant had made an incriminating state-
ment to the police. If the charges were not dismissed, sentence severity
increased with the seriousness of the initial charge and the number of
concurrent felony charges.
The likelihood of dismissal and the severity of the sentence were
also associated with administrative variables, including the type of at-
torney obtained by the defendant, the amount of time spent in pretrial
detention, and whether final disposition was by plea or trial. These as-
sociations were independent of the basic factors in the case against him.
If he had assigned counsel, the defendant charged with a Class 2 felony
(such as larceny or breaking or entering) was less likely to have his
charges dismissed than if he were represented by privately paid counsel.
If his charges were not all dismissed, he was likely to receive a more
severe sentence than if he were represented by privately paid counsel.
The specific form of assigned counsel apparently made a difference:
whether he was charged with a Class 1 (violent) or a Class 2 (theft)
felony, the defendant was considerably less likely to have the charges
dismissed if the defense attorney was individually appointed rather than
privately paid. The chance of dismissal, however, was about the same
for defendants represented by a public defender and those represented
by privately paid lawyers. The amount of time the defendant spent in
to more acquittals, more convictions of reduced charges, and more lenient sentences. For a
substantial increase in trials to occur, however, defendants and their attorneys would have to
operate in concert. This is unlikely to occur, we think, for a number of reasons. Defense
attorneys would be reluctant to make the first move in the direction of increasing trials, know-
ing that they would have to work much harder and that their first few clients affected by such
a move might well pay a high price for it. Also, attorneys may be unwilling to "rock the
boat" and incur the enmity of judges and prosecutors. Finally, many attorneys may simply
lack confidence in their ability to try a case. When plea bargaining was banned in Alaska by
the state's attorney general, defense attorneys continued to enter guilty pleas for their clients
almost as frequently as before the ban. There was a slight increase in trials for felony defend-
ants, but only trial convictions, not acquittals, increased. See M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE &
T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING (1980).
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pretrial detention was found to be consistently associated with court dis-
position: the more time the defendant spent in detention, the lower
were the odds of dismissal convictions, and the more severe the sentence
would be if the defendant were convicted.
These two administrative factors-the type of attorney and the
amount of time spent in pretrial detention-apparently had an in-
dependent influence on court disposition. Pretrial detention time and
type of attorney varied almost independently of other factors we were
able to measure, such as charge, evidence and prior record. Moreover,
as these factors varied, they affected the defendant's ultimate fate in the
trial court, independent of the other characteristics of the case against
him. One result of the association of detention and type of attorney
with court disposition was that black defendants were placed at a disad-
vantage, because they were more likely to have assigned counsel than
white defendants and tended to spend more time in pretrial detention.
This was perhaps due to the fact that blacks had lower incomes than
whites and therefore had more difficulty raising bail money and paying
private lawyers.
57
Discretionary action by prosecutors also had a major impact on the
dispositions of the felony defendants we studied. In fact, a third of the
defendants had all their felony charges dismissed (usually by the prose-
cutor) without further court action, half never reached the indictment
stage, and 59% pled guilty. The substantial variation in defendants'
prospects for disposition among the twelve counties studied showed the
strong effect of local prosecutorial practices. For example, two counties
had systematic post-arrest screening of felony charges, which probably
accounted for the high probablity of dismissal in those counties. In
sharp contrast, a third county had a very low dismissal rate and a high
rate of indictment on felony charges, leading to a much higher propor-
tion of felony convictions than that observed in the other counties.
Plea bargaining was extensive. Nearly three-fifths of the 1,378 fel-
ony defendants we studied pled guilty to at least one charge, and more
than half of these guilty pleas involved a felony-to-misdemeanor reduc-
tion. The majority of defendants who pled guilty did so pursuant to a
written plea bargain stating a quidpro quo. These written plea bargains
often involved a reduction of all charges to misdemeanors or the out-
right dismissal of one or more companion felony charges (see Tables 4
and 5). In nearly half of the written plea bargains the prosecutor prom-
ised to recommend a specific sentence, such as probation or a specific
prison term or range of terms.
Comparison of the sentences received by defendants who pled
57 No reliable data were available on defendants' financial means.
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guilty and those convicted at trial revealed that sentences were much
more severe for those who were convicted at trial. To analyze this
plea/trial sentence differential further, defendants were matched on
"sentence risk" as predicted from such basic factors as charge seriousness
and prior criminal record. Sentences of those who pled guilty were then
compared with sentences of those who went to trial, within each of three
"risk groups" (see Table 8). This comparison suggested that the defend-
ant who went to trial tended to receive a more severe sentence than one
who pled guilty, even taking into account the possibility that he could
be acquitted at trial. This result, however, held true only for defendants
with a moderate-to-high level of sentence "risk" in terms of charge,
criminal record, and other basic factors. The existence of a plea/trial
sentence differential was not confirmed by significance tests in mul-
tivariate regression models of sentencing severity.
The defendant's decision to go to trial rather than plead guilty was
not associated to any great extent with the intrinsic characteristics of his
case. We suspect that administrative variation 58 in plea bargaining-
like administrative variation in pretrial detention and quality of defense
counsel service-was responsible for many of the plea/trial decisions de-
fendants made.
V1. How CAN "INTERIM DECISIONS" BE IMPROVED?
The criminal court reform efforts of the 1970's did not pay enough
attention to "interim decisions," which consist of such intermediate
processes as pretrial detention, defense counsel service, and plea bar-
gaining. For example, the advocates of determinate sentencing focused
on the final act of sentencing and tended to treat it as if it were in-
dependent of earlier decisions made by the court. As the results of the
present study suggest, however, these intermediate processes have a
strong impact on the court's ultimate disposition.
Much variation in the criminal process apparently is attributable to
intermediate processes. As our study shows, the wide variations in
processes such as pretrial detention are partly responsible for the injus-
tices in the criminal process, including the apparent discrimination
against black defendants. Without removing all discretion from these
processes and making them strictly mechanical, there is ample opportu-
nity to reduce their variation, to channel and regularize the discretion
involved, and at the same time, to make the processes work better from
both the defendant's and the public's point of view.
58 Earlier studies in North Carolina have shown variations in prosecutors' plea bargaining
practices among judicial districts and even within a single district attorney's office, as well as




How can opportunities for pretrial release and defense service be
regularized and improved? How can plea bargaining become a more
consistent process, one that is less sensitive to variations in philosophy
and personality among individual prosecutors and judges? In sketching
some answers to these questions, we are especially conscious that the
1980's are a time of shrinking governmental expenditures, and that re-
form proposals requiring additional funding or the creation of new
agencies are not likely to be adopted.
Turning first to pretrial release and detention, there seem to be sev-
eral ways of improving and regularizing bail opportunity and also of
minimzing the risk of nonappearance. Despite two decades of bail re-
form efforts, secured bail bond still plays a major role in determining
pre-trial release. Bail bond's effectiveness in controlling bail risk is de-
batable, 59 but it is quite effective in keeping defendants in jail.60 If se-
cured bond is to continue as the mainstay of pretrial release, it should be
subject to reasonable guidelines. A project is now underway in Philadel-
phia to test this approach.6 1 Alternatives to secured bail bond include
unsecured bail bond and release on recognizance ("ROR"), which may
be accompanied by post-release supervision of the defendant. Research
in Charlotte, North Carolina62 has also shown that existing court per-
sonnel can expand the use of these forms of pretrial release quite success-
fully without hiring special project staff.63 The key to controlling
nonappearance, and to improving pretrial release opportunities, may be
59 Myers' study of New York City defendants indicated that their probablity of nonap-
pearance decreased by about five percentage points for each additional thousand dollars of
bond. Myers also found, paradoxically, that release on recognizance with a zero bond was
associated with a lower chance of nonappearance, other things being equal. Myers, The Eco-
nomics of Bail Jumping, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 381 (1981). The ABA Standards commentary de-
clares that "monetary conditions [of pretrial release] are singularly ineffective," but the
Standards also declare that monetary conditions are appropriate "in cases in which no other
conditions will reasonably ensure the defendant's appearance." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL
RELEASE (2d ed. 1979), § 10-1.3, commentary at 14-17.
60 In a study of indigent New York City defendants, Landes found that, other things
being equal, a $100 increase in bond meant a 27% reduction in the probability of pretrial
release. Landes, Legality and Reality. Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287
(1974). In a study of Alaska felony defendants, Clarke and Emerman found that each addi-
tional $1,000 of bond cost the defendant 1.4 additional days in detention if he was not indi-
gent, and 3.1 days if he were indigent. S. CLARKE & R. EMERMAN, A STUDY OF PRETRIAL
RELEASE IN ANCHORAGE, FAIRBANKS, AND JUNEAU 17, Table 2 (1980).
61 See J. GOLDKAMP, M. GOTTFREDSON & S. MITCHELL-HERZFELD, BAIL DECISIONMAK-
ING: A STUDY OF POLICY GUIDELINES (1981).
62 S. CLARKE, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHARLOTTE, 1971-73 (1974).
63 Recent research in several sites across the country suggests that ROR projects have
improved opportunities for pretrial release although they had not led to more effective control
of failure to appear in court. M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION
OF PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES (1981). Few states, however, may be able to find funds for
specially-staffed ROR programs at the present time,
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to put a single official in charge of pretrial release at the local court
level. This official could monitor all forms of pretrial release including
secured bond. A fairer, more systematic allocation of pretrial release
opportunity to defendants would not necessarily increase the total re-
leased, but at least it would reduce a source of considerable variation in
court disposition. If the total number of defendants released were in-
creased, a net saving in jail costs might eventually result.
As for defense counsel, a recent report by the American Bar As-
sociation finds that defense counsel for the indigent defendant-a con-
stitutional right-is quite inadequate. "Indeed, public defender and
assigned counsel programs experience virtually every imaginable kind of
financial deficiency. There are neither enough lawyers to represent the
poor, nor are all the available attorneys trained, supervised, assisted by
ample support staffs, or sufficiently compensated. '64 Our study demon-
strates the consequences of this inadequacy: the indigent felony defend-
ant represented by a public defender or an individually appointed
lawyer is at a disadvantage in sentencing. Our study, as well as a previ-
ous study by the North Carolina Bar Association, 65 indicates, however,
that the public defender system may well be more effective than the
individual appointment system in avoiding conviction. Furthermore,
in North Carolina at least, the public defender system is considerably
cheaper than the individual appointment system.6 6 If this cost advan-
tage holds true in other states, expansion of public defender systems
would be appropriate.
How can the variation in the quality of defense counsel service be
reduced? It might be reduced by increased integration of criminal de-
fense services in each state, aimed at meeting model national standards
such as those of the American Bar Association. This does not necessarily
mean creating an expensive new agency; a state bar association, court
administration, or other existing state agency or organization could ad-
minister this process. An integrated approach might well produce effi-
ciencies and net savings, in addition to equalizing opportunities for
defense services.
Despite recent research, much remains to be learned about how
plea bargaining may respond to reform efforts. Still, we believe that two
64 N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 56 (1982).
65 FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 77-83.
66 A statewide comparison in North Carolina in fiscal year 1981 indicated that the cost
per case, including personnel and all other support costs, was S181 for individually-appointed
counsel and $130 for public defenders. These figures include felony, misdemeanor, and juve-
nile delinquency cases. Cost Comparison Study of Public Defenders and Appointed Counsel
for Indigent Criminal Defendants (unpublished report prepared by Leslie R. Stevens of the
North Carolina State Budget Office at the request of the North Carolina Courts Commission,
presented in Raleigh, November 5, 1982).
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changes could help to make plea bargaining more rational and even-
handed. One is to require judicially supervised plea negotiation along
the lines suggested by Norman Lefstein.67 Lefstein recommends that at
the defense's request, the court should convene a plea conference with
the prosecutor at which the trial judge would preside. The judge would
neither encourage nor discourage a plea. The defendant would have a
right to appear and speak and the conference would be recorded verba-
tim. The judge would be required to disclose the sentence that would be
imposed if the defendant pled guilty, and also the sentence the defend-
ant could expect if convicted by trial, assuming that no additional facts
adverse to the defendant were revealed at trial. Another improvement
would be to require that prosecutors issue written guidelines generally
describing their plea bargaining policies, including what kinds of offers
presumptively will be made, and to which defendants. The response
from prosecutors and judges to such proposals may well be that they
would make it harder to plea bargain, and therefore increase the
number of trials. We doubt very much that trials would increase, since
they would still be considerably more costly than guilty pleas, in terms
of time, work, and risk, to both prosecution and defense. 68 Regardless of
whether trials would increase or not, reforms of the criminal process will
fail unless they come to grips with the plea bargaining process, which
lies at its heart.
67 Lefstein, supra note 18, at 518-22.
68 Guilty pleas proved very durable in Alaska when plea bargaining was banned there.
M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, supra note 56. Trials increased from 6.7 percent to
9.6 percent of felony dispositions, but the entire increase occurred in trial convictions, which
certainly would not have discouraged guilty pleas. Guilty pleas, which had been 41.0%
before the ban, dropped only slightly to 37.7% afterwards. Id. at 146-52.
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